TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 3rd 1940

WEATHER:

After early morning mist, especially in low lying areas, the south and south-east should experience a warm and fine day. Possibility of haze in many Channel areas. In the north, most areas can expect low cloud and drizzle with scattered heavy falls along the north-east coast and southern Scotland.

OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:

0830hrs: A large build-up is forming over the Pas de Calais. Again, Bf109 fighters advance ahead of the Dornier Do17s and Messerschmitt Bf110 bombers. Again Fighter Command refuse to engage the leading fighters, instead timing their take offs to engage the main bomber force at the latest possible moment, this way, the leading Bf109s have used up valuable fuel and it would not be long before they had to return back towards their bases.

0930hrs: The bombers are flying up the Thames and just off of Canvey Island make their turn north-west. It becomes obvious, that the targets would be North Weald or Debden, although Park was taking no chances that the German bombers could come in towards London from the north.

603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) was given the order to "scramble", and it was clear now that the German formation consisted of 50+ Dornier Do17s, 80 Bf110s and 40+ Bf109s. 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) were also "scrambled" and between them done all in their power to abort any attack by the German bombers.

Squadron Leader Richard Hillary of 603 Squadron had just had a new canopy fitted to his Spitfire and for some reason as the "scramble" call sounded, he and a Corporal on the ground staff tried desperately to free it by grinding, filing and oiling, but it was stuck fast. But with sheer determination, they manage to get it open halfway, Hillary climbed in, took off and flew the rest of the sortie with the canopy half open.

In another incident. Two Blenheim's, returning to North Weald were accidently mistaken for Bf110s by a couple of Hurricane pilots. They opened fire on the helpless fighter bombers only to shoot down and destroy two of their own aircraft.

It is estimated that over 150 bombs fell on North Weald, many of them delayed-action which caused substantial damage. The hangars belonging to 25 and 151 Squadrons were severely damages by bombs and the fire that broke out afterwards. A number of buildings were hit also the main stores depot. The new sector operations room got a direct hit and although suffering severe damage managed to continue operations. Communications with the Observer Corps was severed with the exception of just one line. In the attack, four personnel on the ground are killed with twenty injured. [1]

After the bombing, we heard machine guns firing off and thought that they had got the ammunitions dump. The decontamination centre proved to be far from bomb-proof. The M.T. Yard was ablaze. The Ops block had been hit, but not much damage had been done. The was a D-A bomb outside the telephone exchange. In fact, except the officers' mess, which survived both raids, there was hardly any building that hadn't been damaged. They got some of the hangars, but all our aircraft were up, except a few which were being serviced.

I and two other plotters climbed into a civilian lorry and went off to Emergency Ops. All the service transport in the yard had been blown up. On the way, we thought there was another attack coming, but it was our aircraft returning.

We ran Ops from Emergency Ops, and worked all that day and through the next night. We had to cook for ourselves and the airmen.

Aircraftwoman Cooper then stationed at North Weald

0945hrs: Hornchurch and Debden also received considerable damage, but all stations remained operational. From Duxford, 310 Czech Squadron encountered a formation of Bf110s of 1Z/G2 and surprised the German pilots with outrageous manoeuvres and daredevil antics. They screamed in for the kill with throttles wide open, calling and shouting excitedly in their own language. On their return to base, they were all given a dressing down by their station commander, who stated that their rather unusual methods of attacking not only caused a danger to themselves, but to all those that shared the sky with them. They were also told that such unconventional methods must cease immediately. The station commander then finished off by reading a memorandum from Fighter Command who congratulated them on their actions and in the shooting down and destruction of 4 Bf110s and their crews.

Park had ordered as many as eleven squadrons up. Including assistance from 12 Group who sent the Czech 310 Squadron (Hurricanes) to provide assistance cover at North Weald. Coming in from the north east they were immediately thrown into the action. They met the Bf110s of I/ZG2 and as the fighter bombers weaved, intent on completing their attack on the airfield, the Czech squadron managed to claim four Bf110s.

In total, five Bf110s of ZG2 were destroyed. The first was when a Bf110 (3M+EK) collided with another Bf110 (3M+HL) and crashed and exploded in flames at Harlow north of North Weald at 1045hrs. The Bf110 (3M+HL) was at the time being pursued by Hurricanes of 310 Squadron and trying to take evasive action when it collided with 3M+EK. Although 310 Squadron made a claim for this Bf110 it really could not be accepted. It crashed at Epping south of North Weald. Also at 1045hrs, prior to attacking North Weald, a Bf110 (3M+BK) was attacked by Spitfires of 222 Squadron Hornchurch and shot down at Reculver. Both crew baled out and were captured by motor boat crew off Herne Bay. At 1100hrs, P/O J.M.V. Carpenter of 222 Squadron Hornchurch, Sgt. B. Furst of 310 Squadron Duxford and Sgt. G.C. Unwin of 19 Squadron Duxford all laid claims for the destruction of Bf110 (3M+CB) which crashed at Stowmaries. Finally, at 1118hrs, a Bf110 (3M+EL) was shot down possibly by F/O Count M.B. Czernin of 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) and crashed at Canewden Essex.[2]

It is interesting to note regarding this last mentioned crash of Bf110 3M+EL.that excavators in the 1970's had to dig to a depth of 35 feet before both engines were recovered, as well as six propeller blades, a tail wheel that was still inflated and undercarriage struts. Also found were instruments from the cockpit, the control column, a first aid kit, a gunners tool kit, and pieces of the tailfin that still bore markings of the Swastika.

In addition to the above, Bf110s of ZG26 also on escort duty to Do17 bombers, came under attack over the southern coast of Essex. One of them was damaged by British fighters over Southend where it had to make a crash landing. P/O Count Czernin of 17 Squadron claimed another when he shot down another Bf110 over Wickford at 1030hrs, although claims for this aircraft was also made by Sub Lt J.C. Carpenter of 46 Squadron. Then Spitfires of 54 Squadron attacked another Bf110 over the Thames Estuary at 1038hrs and partially disabled it. It was finally shot down by F/O B. van Menz of 222 Squadron over Southend where it crashed at North Shoebury House.

1000hrs: With the damage done, and North Weald in a shambles, Hornchurch damaged but only regarded as minor and parts of Tilbury and the London Docks also damaged by H.E and I.B, the raiders began their retreat back eastwards. 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires) and 310 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes) managed to intercept about 50 Do17s with about 100 Bf109s returning after their raids on East London. S/L P.C. Pinkham had taken 19 Squadron up to 20,000 feet and managed to look down on the returning enemy with a still burning North Weald as a backdrop. Three of the aircraft that swooped down on the enemy formation suffered with jammed guns. Green section fared better and managed to down two Bf110s and another was seen to be trying to escape by flying at about 50 above the waters of the Thames Estuary towards Whitstable.

Meanwhile, 603 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) are warned by the Hornchurch controller that they have about 50 plus bandits above them. 603 Squadron decide to go in line astern and at the same time the 109s dive towards the Spitfires. The British fighters have no time to gain height, and the climb is aborted so as to attempt to gain speed. But the Bf109s in their dive already have the momentum and their speed is far greater than that of the Spitfires. With defensive actions, 603 Squadron turn and meet the 109s and a dogfight that means every man for himself. P/O R.H. Hillary lines up a target and fire short bursts, but the Messerschmitt fails to go down. How much more punishment can it take. Hillary gives it another four second burst, smoke starts to appear, it gets thicker then suddenly the 109 explodes into flame and falls towards the sea.

Just as the Bf109 exploded, Hillary's Spitfire vibrates as he himself has taken a hit. In an instant, the cockpit of the Spitfire bursts into flames, Hillary tries to open the cockpit hood, but it is stuck fast. The new hood has given nothing but trouble ever since it was fitted. He undoes his harness in an attempt to gain better leverage. Flames are now licking all over him. He gives every ounce of his strength to open the jammed canopy and it slides slowly, he has to release his hold as he is near exhaustion. He tries to grab the control column to turn the Spitfire on its back, but the heat is far too intense and raises his hands over his face for protection but faints in the process. The Spitfire starts to spin and somehow as it rolls over on its back during an uncontrollable roll, P/O Richard Hillary, still in an unconscious state falls from the plane at about 10,000 feet.

He free falls, how many feet he does not know, but the cold air slowly brings him out of unconsciousness. He realizes where he is, out of the burning plane and free falling. He pulls the ripcord, and his body suddenly comes to a thump as the canopy of silk takes effect and he glides slowly down towards the sea off the town of Margate. Many observe him coming down in the sea, but the Margate lifeboat has difficulty in locating him and searched for three hours. Eventually he is picked up, suffering serious burns to his face and body, and never to see action in the Battle of Britain again. [3]

In his book The Last Enemy Richard Hillary thought about the pilots that he was to maim or kill during the battle:

I wondered what he was like, this man I would kill. Was he young, was he fat, would he die with the Führers name on his lips, or would he die alone, in that last moment conscious of himself as a man? I would never know. Then I was being strapped in, my mind automatically checking the controls, and we were off.

P/O R.H. Hillary 603 Squadron RAF in his book The Last Enemy

For Richard Hillary the tables had been turned. We can now wonder if Hauptmann E. Bode of II/JG26, the man who shot him down had the same thoughts and feelings as his victim had.

1030hrs: Hermann Göring had arranged a meeting with his Air Fleet Commanders and it was at the Hague that they all met, with the usual introductions of wine, delicacies and light hearted humour before getting down to the serious business of discussing the current situation as it stood at the moment. (Göring was a lover of good food and wine and nearly all meetings organized commenced or ended with a fine banquet).

The Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief told his commanders that there were a number of reasons that progress had been slow and that he makes no apologies that Adlerangriff had not yet been completed. He told the commanders that the attacks on the RAF airfields had not been heavy enough, that they had made concentrated attacks on Biggin Hill and that although it was still operational, its efficiency had been greatly reduced. We cannot ease up on these attacks he stated, and that we must continue with our unleashing power to continue, with greater number of aircraft, make more use of the Bf110 because of its greater range than the Bf109, which should be used as an advance fighter do draw the British fighters into the air.

Göring stated that he believed that he was under pressure to make preparations for an all out attack on British cities including London itself. But, the British air force is still giving London full protection, and Germany would be foolhardy to yet make any attack on the capital. "We must," he emphasised, "completely demoralise and destroy the British Royal Air Force before any major raids can be launched. And that, we have almost achieved, as the reports that I have at hand state that the enemy is now down to its reserves." To continue these attacks the way will soon be open for all out raids on their cities in safety.

Albert Kesselring commander of Luflotten (Air Fleet) 2 while in agreeance with his commander that the Royal Air Force was low on machines and pilots as he agreed with German intelligence that the RAF had very few fighter aircraft left, but believed that the raids on British cities including London should commence at once. On the other hand, Hugo Sperle, commander of Luftflotten 3 based in Paris was a little more apprehensive. He stated that he could not agree that the RAF was down to its last reserves, and that his sources state that the British Royal Air Force still had in excess of 600 aircraft based on operations in the southern portion of England and that a further reinforcement of 400 aircraft could be called upon from areas in the north and west bringing a total of 1000 fighters. Sperle was really closer to the truth than Göring or Kesselring.

Meanwhile, in Great Britain, they saw things differently. AVM Keith Park (Commander of 11 Group) was concerned about the lack of serviceable aircraft, but even more so, the lack of fully trained pilots to fly the aircraft. At Bentley Priory, ACM Hugh Dowding agreed, stating that the situation was grim and that things may get worse before they get better. Regarding the number of serviceable aircraft available, both Göring and Sperle were way off of the actual and true figure. Throughout the month of August 1940, the number of aircraft that was available for operations remained steady in number even accounting for some terrible losses, and thanks must surely go to Canadian Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister for Aircraft Production for the effort in continuing being able to produce aircraft under strenuous circumstances. But for Park and Dowding, the figures were not good. The month of July 1940 produced more aircraft than was planned, but during the following months, even though a considerable number of aircraft rolled off the production lines, it was still below the number of aircraft planned. We can again look at the number of aircraft planned and the number produced in [ Document 42 ]

1400hrs: After the success of the mornings attack, the Luftwaffe attempted another series of raids, and following the same course and pattern as they had done just five hours previously. However, this was a light-hearted affair in comparison with the morning raids. Fighter Command put up the usual strong opposition once the attackers had crossed the coast. More squadrons, and a request for 12 Group to give protection to North Weald again, were put up and this time Keith Park was prepared. But most of the raids were aborted and many of the RAF fighter squadron began chasing the enemy back towards their own coastline. No damage was recorded.

AVM Keith Park was concerned by the number of aircraft that he did have available, and of course the number of trained pilots he had to fly them. According to Parks biographer Vincent Orange Keith Park knew that the ultimate target for Germany.....London was not too far off. But as he had informed Hugh Dowding and Lord Beaverbrook, as long as we can show strength and dominance in the defence of southern England, be can hold off, but if a high attrition rate occurs, the time left that would be available to them will be drastically shortened.

In these first few days of September, Park brought to the attention of Hugh Dowding, that he believed that the squadrons transferred to 11 Group from 12 Group were not highly trained pilots and compared these with those that had been transferred from 13 Group. He made a comparison that showed that squadrons transferred from 13 Group had been credited with forty-three aircraft destroyed at a cost of two pilots missing and two wounded, while those transferred from 12 Group had brought down only seventeen aircraft and had lost a total of thirteen pilots for the same period. Park claimed that AVM Richard Saul always chose experienced squadrons to be transferred to units in the south, where AVM Leigh-Mallory did not.

Park wrote about the state of affairs of 11 Group that had occurred over the last few days:

"Contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes, and also to six of our seven sector stations." Manston and Lympne were unfit for operations 'on several occasions for days' and Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that for over a week it could operate only one squadron. Had the Luftwaffe continued to attack these sectors, 'the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital."

Sector operation rooms suffered both from direct hits and damage to landlines. They all had to use emergency rooms, though these were too small and poorly equipped to cope with the normal control of three squadrons per sector.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, C-in-C 11 Group

On the German side, even though no was prepared to admit it, the state of affairs was in reality even worse. The RAF claims at the time regarding the number of enemy aircraft shot down was well above the actual true figure. This was partly due to the antiquated way of establishing a days tally. If many of the pilots were a little more truthful about their claims a more realistic figure may have been reached. Pilots were asked at the end of a mission if they had any 'kills' to report, many pilots claimed for enemy aircraft that they shot at, went down bellowing smoke, but did not see them actually crash, often due to the fact that they had become locked in combat with another enemy aircraft. Many were honest and claimed it as a probable, but it was often the case that is was claimed as a 'kill'. In a number of cases pilots were asked to describe any markings, and when these were given, they were told that two other pilots had also claimed that aircraft. Was there another way, possibly not, but the high figure given done wonders for public morale.

According to Williamson Murray, the author of "Strategy for Defeat - The Luftwaffe" the Luftwaffe possessed on June 29th 1940, a total aircraft strength of 4,482 aircraft. During the period July-September 1940 the total destroyed both on operations and on non-operations was 1,636 that is 37% of the total strength destroyed. Of these, the highest casualty rate was for the Bf110 twin engined fighter which at June 29th had a total of 357 and in the July-September period lost 235 in total and of this 214 were due to enemy action, 66% of all Bf110s had been destroyed. Next highest on the list was the Bf109. Out of 1,107 aircraft, 518 were destroyed, that is 47% of their original number.

Then if we quickly look at the number of aircraft damaged, we find that things do not get any better. Of the original 4,482 aircraft available on June 29th 1940, 697 aircraft had been damaged in some way. That is a staggering 52% if we combine the destroyed and damaged totals together of the original total.

If we look at the figures just for the month past, that is August 1940, we find the following table:

AIRCRAFT

DESTROYED

PILOTS KILLED

CAPTURED

INJURED

UNINJURED

MISSING

Bf109

229

Bf110

123

Do17

HeIII

Ju88

104

Ju87

TOTALS

691

216

117

264

The attrition rate as seen from the above table was exceptionally high, and this must have had some sort of impact on crews and on morale. As the table indicates, the pilot losses for August were disproportionally high compared to actual aircraft losses, undoubtedly reflecting the fact that most of the air fighting occurred over the Channel or over British territory. [4]

CASUALTIES:

1035hrs: River Crouch (Poss). Hurricane P3064. 46 Squadron Stapleford

Sgt G.H. Edworthy Listed as missing. (Believed to have crashed in River after combat over Essex coast)

1045hrs: Ingatestone Essex. Hurricane P3518. 257 Squadron Debden

P/O C.R. Bon Seigneur killed. (Shot down by EA. Baled out but fell dead soon after landing)

1055hrs: Foulness Island. Hurricane P3539. 17 Squadron Debden

F/O D.H.W. Hanson killed. (Shot down but baled out of aircraft at 100 feet. Killed on impact)

1115hrs: North Weald. Blenheim L1512. 25 Squadron North Weald

P/O D. Hogg killed (Thought to have been Bf110 and shot down by Hurricane. Sgt E. Powel baled out unhurt)

1130hrs: Chart Sutton (Kent). Hurricane P3782. 1 Squadron Northolt

P/O R.H. Shaw Listed as missing. (Crashed from unknown circumstances. Pilot killed in aircraft)

1130hrs: Location unkown. Hurricane P3044. 1 Squadron Northolt

F/Lt H.B.L. Hillcoat Listed as missing. (Failed to return from standard squadron patrol)

* Later Air Vice Marshal A.V.R. Johnstone.

[1] John Frayn Turner The Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p86

[2] Details from The Blitz Then & Now Vol1 edited by Winston S.Ramsey p304

[3] Dennis Newton A Few of the Few Australian War Memorial 1990 p152

[4] Williamson Murray Strategy For Defeat Quintet 1986 pp48-50